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1.  Why were you initially drawn to probability theory and/or statistics? 
 
I first developed an interest in statistical methods in the late 70’s and early 80’s during my 
undergraduate studies in Social Sciences at the Catholic University of Leuven.  During my graduate 
studies at the University of Minnesota, I was introduced to modelling in microeconomics by Leonid 
Hurwicz in a series of graduate courses. Graham Oddie and Stephen Leeds at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder sparked my interest in Bayesianism in philosophy of science in the mid-90s.  The 
University of Colorado had a strong programme in probabilistic modelling—so I lined up my book case 
with Sheldon Ross’s books and pretended to be a student in a sequence of courses in the 
mathematics and applied-mathematics departments.       
 
Beyond this, much was due to chance—as is fitting considering the theme of this volume.   
 
In the summer of 1997 James Hawthorne and I worked on the lottery paradox and the preface paradox 
which led to our joint Mind (1999) article. He steered me towards the last chapter in Judea Pearl’s 
Probabilistic Reasoning in Intelligent Systems on the connection between logic and probability.  But 
the graphs of Bayesian Networks in the beginning of the book drew my attention.  My tenure file was in 
and I had some time to explore new horizons. I started reading on Bayesian Networks and played 
around with Bayesian-Networks software.  
 
The following year I was on a Humboldt fellowship at the University of Konstanz.  I attended a seminar 
by Wolfgang Spohn, who has done early work on conditional independence structures—one of the 
pillars of Bayesian Networks.  I met Erik J. Olsson who had an interest in formal epistemology and 
Stephan Hartmann who had an interest in models in science.  We started exploring how Bayesian 
Network methodology could be applied to problems in the coherence theory of justification and in 
philosophy of science.  This led to two joint publications (Mind, 2000 and Erkenntnis, 2002) with Erik 
and a series of articles culminating in a monograph (Bayesian Epistemology, 2003) with Stephan.      
   
Wlodek Rabinowicz and I met in the University of Leipzig in 1999.  Wlodek was thinking about the 
discursive dilemma in joint work with Philip Pettit and they had formulated some interesting 
conjectures.  At the time, there had been some changes in the tenure proceedings in the University of 
Colorado and this raised some questions that were in the neighbourhood of Philip and Wlodek’s 
conjectures about the discursive dilemma.  Consider the following two procedures. One could take 
votes by the tenured faculty on the candidate’s qualifications on teaching and research separately and 
award tenure just in case there is a majority in favour on each score.  Or one could have the faculty 
assess in their own minds whether the candidate is qualified on both scores and decide the matter by 
a simple majority vote.  Which procedure is the better truth-tracker, i.e. yields the fewest false positives 
and false negatives?  This question opened up some fruitful new lines of inquiry into probabilistic 
approaches to judgment aggregation. (Synthese, 2006)     
 
Wlodek and I knew that our curiosity was sparked by the same kind of things.  Much of my later 
research started with two short newspaper clippings that we sent to each other.  Wlodek was amused 
by the French response to a proposal by the Swedish delegation to set the weights of the various 
countries in the EU Council of Ministers proportional to the square root of their population sizes.  
Chirac commented that he failed to see the political significance of the square root.  I sent Wlodek a 
clipping about an interesting hats puzzle that was first formulated by Todd Ebert and was occupying 
computer scientists.  Hats are passed around in the dark and you have a 50-50 chance of obtaining a 
white or a black hat.  The lights are turned on and you see the colour of other people’s hats, but not 
your own.  You are asked to call the colour of your own hat.  If at least one person calls it correctly and 
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nobody does so incorrectly, then, allowing for passes, the group receives a prize.  What strategy 
should the group adopt?     
    
As to the first clipping, I told Stephan about the Swedish delegation and the square root rule when 
taking a break from Bayesian Epistemology over a restaurant lunch.  In fact, the square root rule for 
the representation in a Federal Assembly goes back to a proposal made by Penrose, in work on voting 
power in the 40’s, but the Swedish delegation or we knew nothing about this.  Our ignorance sent us 
down a different track.  We asked ourselves what the likely implications would be of different voting 
weights on the welfare distribution for the various countries in the European Union.  After filling up the 
paper table cover with calculations, we moved on to Mathematica for simulations, which yielded some 
interesting results. (Reasoning, Rationality and Probability, 2006 and European Union Politics, 2005) 
This was Spring 2001 and at the time there was not much literature on welfarist approaches to the 
evaluation of voting procedures yet.                  
   
I received a Sofja Kovalevskaja award from the vonHumboldt foundation, which permitted me to set up 
a research group named Philosophy, Probability and Modelling (PPM) in the University of Konstanz 
from 2002-5.  Stephan Hartmann and I co-directed the group.  There was a wonderful sense of 
synergy in this group, which centred around issues of philosophy of probability, broadly construed.     
 
Claus Beisbart (one of the PPM-members) and I started working on joint projects in voting theory that 
involve probabilistic modelling. We have been working on the US Electoral College—first on 
Colorado’s Amendment 36 (Public Choice, 2007) and now on the proposal in California to move to a 
district-by-district procedure. In more theoretical work, we determine optimal weights for voters in a 
federal assembly on egalitarian and utilitarian grounds and show how these results generalise to 
results in the voting power literature. (Social Choice and Welfare, 2007) Rousseau’s remarks on 
factions inspired a probabilistic model that provides a novel justification for less-than-full proportionality 
in federal assemblies. (Analysis, 2007)   We are currently exploring a measure of a posteriori voting 
power—i.e. of the influence that voters have on the outcome taking into consideration actual voting 
profiles and interactions between voters—by means of Bayesian Networks methodology. (Texts in 
Logic and Games, 2008)      
 
As to the clipping on the hats puzzle, Wlodek responded with a variant of the puzzle that seemed to 
indicate that it was possible to make a Dutch Book against a group of players who are making 
independent decisions in the interest of the group.  It only dawned on us much later that this is a 
strategic decision-making problem.  A simple game-theoretical argument shows that rational players 
would actually evade the Dutch Book.  This seemed like a story of paradox gained, paradox lost.  But 
en route there were a wide array of lessons to be learned.  The puzzle is relevant to Ramsey’s 
analysis of degrees of belief as fair betting rates  (Foundations of the Formal Sciences VI, 2009), to 
Dutch Book arguments for the Sleeping Beauty, and to the strategic voting literature.  (Synthese, 2009)  
It also brings out curious features of doubly symmetric games with applications to the tragedy of the 
commons, which I am currently exploring with Maurice Koster and Ines Lindner.      
 
I have come full circle in my most recent work and returned to problems in statistics for the social 
sciences.  I was struck by the plight of African migrants who clung to tuna nets in the Mediterranean 
struggling for their lives, with Malta and Libya quibbling about who should rescue them.  Chechnyan 
asylum seekers have a high chance of acceptance in Sweden and a close to zero chance in Slovakia.  
It seemed that what was needed was an expert system for asylum seekers to determine where they 
should file a claim.  To avoid asylum shopping, the EU is actually trying to bring more unity in their 
dealings with asylum seekers through the 1999 Tampere Agreement.  What we have available is 
yearly UNHCR data detailing the proportion of asylum seekers from various countries of origin that 
have been granted refugee status by each EU host country.  In joint work with Paresh Kathrani, we are 
trying to assess whether there is a tendency toward or away from a more unified policy, as reflected in 
the acceptance rates of the EU host countries, on the basis of this data.  There are various techniques 
for describing interrelations in multivariate data in the social sciences.  The design and application of 
these techniques yield interesting conceptual questions.   
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Many thanks to everyone with whom I have had the good fortune to work.  It has been a joy.  Many 
thanks also to the Choice Group at the LSE which has been a source of inspiration.  What I like about 
probabilistic models is that they often lead to surprising results.  This  is also what attracts me to doing 
collaborative work.  You never know beforehand what will happen  when you hook up two or more 
cognitive systems, especially when they have been trained differently.  And then it does make the 
journey less lonesome.    
 
2. What is distinctive about your work in the foundations of probability or its applications? 
 
I distinguish here between the following three strands in my work.  First, I have an interest in epistemic 
paradoxes and some of this work touches on probability theory.  Second, I use probability theory and 
probabilistic networks in addressing issues in epistemology and philosophy of science.  And third, my 
work is of an interdisciplinary nature.  I make use of probabilistic techniques in addressing normative 
questions in social and political theory—and in particular in voting theory.  
 
What is distinctive about my work on epistemic paradoxes?  Maybe it is this: I don’t tend to rush to 
dissolve a paradox, but rather, my tendency is to cherish a paradox and to see to what use it can be 
put and how it connects to a wide range of issues.  In the work on the lottery and the preface 
paradoxes, we try to use these paradoxes to spell out a relationship between quantitative and 
qualitative doxastic notions, i.e. between degrees of belief and plain belief.  I tried my hand at the 
connection between the surprise exam paradox and backward induction arguments in game theory—
but am dissatisfied with the results and would like to pick up the topic again some day.  In the work that 
was sparked by the hats puzzle, we explore its connection to degrees of beliefs as betting rates, 
doubly symmetric games, self-locating beliefs in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the tragedy of the 
commons and strategic voting.  
 
Let me now turn to epistemology.  The Cartesian sceptic claims that we are never justified in believing 
any of the information from the external world that impinges on us through our senses.  All these 
information items may be like Descartes’ stick in the water that appears bent. In response, a 
coherence theorist claims that we are justified in believing at least some external-world information on 
grounds of its coherence.  It would be quite implausible that every item in the story that we have 
gathered about the world would be false, considering how well this story fits together.  There might be 
an occasional misleading item like the seemingly bent stick in the water, but if all items were like that, 
then how could the story come out to be so coherent?  The standard challenge to the coherentist is: 
What could possibly be meant by information being more and less coherent?  The methodology we 
appeal to in answering this question is distinctly interdisciplinary. 
 
Coherence of information only matters to our degree of confidence that the information is true if the 
information comes from multiple independent and partially reliable sources.  To model information 
updating with independent sources, we make use of conditional independence structures and the 
theory of Bayesian Networks in computer science.     
 
Furthermore, there are various influences from economic modelling. 
 
First, we borrow the notion of separability from consumer demand theory.  We search for a set of 
separable variables that determine our degree of confidence that the information provided is true.  In 
trying to identify a measure of coherence, we try to identify a variable that (i) is a function of the 
probability distribution over the propositions in the information set and (ii) is in line with our ordinary 
notion of coherence and (iii) increases our degree of confidence in the information provided, ceteris 
paribus, where this ceteris paribus clause is cashed out in terms of separability.     
 
Second, the measurement of coherence is inspired by Atkinson’s work in welfare economics.  One 
could ask—look, what is equality good for?  Well if it’s good for increasing overall welfare, then we 
could compare levels of welfare in different societies with a fixed total income.  Society A has an 
income distribution that is more equal than the income distribution of society B, if it is the case that is 
greater in A than in B for any strictly concave utility function of income the level of welfare.  This 
criterion yields a quasi-ordering for the relation ‘... being no less unequal than ...’  Similarly, we 
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asked—what is coherence good for?  What it is good for is that it makes us more likely to believe the 
story that transpires upon being informed of its constituent items by partially reliable and independent 
witnesses.  So let us assess the actual joint posterior probability after the information is in.  Now 
suppose that the information would have come to us in fully coherent format—i.e. each witness would 
not have provided us with one single item of the story, but with the whole story.  We assess what the 
joint posterior probability would have been under these idealised conditions.  Now construct the ratio of 
the actual joint posterior probability over the joint posterior probability under conditions of full 
coherence.  If this ratio for one information set exceeds the ratio for another set no matter how we 
specify the degree of reliability of the witnesses, then the former set is more coherent than the latter.  
This only yields a coherence quasi-ordering, but this is how we like things to be.  For sets that remain 
unordered by this procedure, we also lack a clear intuitive judgment whether one set is more or less 
coherent than the other.  There have been clever counter examples to this proposal. (Meijs and 
Douven, Mind, 2005)  I am somewhat nervous, but there is some room to wriggle and I am not 
convinced that our wriggling has been unsatisfactory. (Bovens and Hartmann, Mind, 2005)  
 
And third, there is the influence of social choice theory.  We construct an impossibility theorem, Arrow-
style.  There is the surprising consequence that it is impossible to construct a coherence ordering over 
information sets such that more coherent sets induce a greater boost in our degree-of-confidence upon 
being informed by independent and partially reliable sources, ceteris paribus.  As I mentioned, one 
escape route is to settle for a quasi-ordering and this may be precisely what we want.  Another escape 
route is to construct vectors of separable coherence measures but there is no straightforward 
interpretation of these vectors that maps onto our ordinary notion of coherence.  
 
In philosophy of science, we introduce a model of unreliable instruments.  The model is characterised 
by two parameters, viz. a parameter that measures the prior probability of the reliability of the 
instrument and a parameter that measures the probability of obtaining positive test results if the 
instrument is unreliable.  We can then use this simple model to test the variety-of-evidence thesis, the 
Duhem-Quine thesis and the effectiveness of calibration procedures.  For instance, is it true that in 
hypothesis testing, we may be more confident upon receiving confirming test results from multiple 
independent instruments rather than from a single instrument?  Not quite—it depends on the values of 
the parameters.  For certain parameter values, consistent test results may increase our confidence in 
the reliability of a single test instrument and this trumps the value of consistent results from multiple 
independent test instruments.  Using a combination of Bayesian network methodology and 
Mathematica software we construct contour lines to determine the parameter values for which the 
variety-of-evidence thesis (under a particular interpretation) holds and for which the thesis does not 
hold.  What is distinctive about our work is that we import this standard methodology of scientific 
modelling to take on philosophical questions.  This permits us to provide nuanced answers—the truth 
of certain claims is contingent on the values of a set of relevant parameters.      
 
In voting theory, Banzhaf voting power is the chance that a voter is pivotal under the Bernoulli model.  
This is the chance that had she voted differently, then the vote would have gone differently, assuming 
that there is an equal chance that voters vote for or against a proposal and assuming that votes are 
cast independently.  Our work diverges from this standard approach in two respects.  First, our 
approach is welfarist.  The implementation of a proposal may affect different people’s welfare in 
different ways.  The impact on a person’s welfare of a proposal is a random variable and a proposal is 
represented as a vector of random variables—one for each person (or subgroup) affected.  This then 
permits us to assess different voting rules relative to various desiderata, e.g. one may wish to institute 
a voting rule that maximises expected welfare or that equalises expected welfare.  This approach is 
particularly useful for assessing the representation of states in a federal assembly such as the Council 
of Ministers in the EU and the Electoral College in the US.  Second, our approach is cautiously a 
posteriori, i.e. we explore to what extent one can take into account information about actual voting 
patterns and various types of welfare dependencies in the evaluation of voting rules.  In my most 
recent work with Claus Beisbart, we consider how the presence of opinion leaders affects the actual 
influence of the voters by means of the Balke-Pearl theory of counterfactuals in the framework of 
Bayesian Networks.       
        
3. How do you conceive of the relationship between probability theory and/or statistics and 
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other disciplines? 
 
I will take the liberty to twist this question somewhat and consider the role of probability theory and in 
particular, probabilistic modelling, in philosophy.  At least at first sight, many philosophical questions 
lend themselves to a kind of methodology that is common in the sciences.  Why would one want to 
look at philosophical problems in this vein?  For the same reasons that one would use this type of 
methodology in the sciences.  There is clarity to be gained, as  one considers the following questions 
in model construction.  What are the relevant variables?  What are the relations between the 
variables?  Are there stochastic dependencies between the variables?  How can the variables be 
measured?  The determining factors pull in different directions and intuitions often give out in these 
matters.  What factors win out for what values of the relevant parameters?   
 
One of the attractions of probabilistic modelling is that one often has no clue beforehand what results 
will materialise and there is a genuine surprise element in one’s work.  Let me give you two examples.   
 
Here is a result from Bayesian epistemology.  Suppose that the prior joint probability of all the 
propositions in set S is the same as the prior joint probability of all the propositions in set S’, but that 
the data in S is more coherent—i.e. fits together better—than the data in S’.  Then it can be shown that 
we would be more confident that the propositions in S are true than that the propositions in S’ are true 
after independent and equally reliable witnesses each attest to the truth of these propositions, there 
being a single witness for each proposition.  This is unsurprising.  But now consider two information 
sets S and S’ with positive and negative dependencies between their constituent propositions within 
each set and equal prior joint probabilities.  Suppose that we are informed by witnesses with high 
reliability who each independently attest to a proposition in the respective sets.  Alternatively suppose 
that we are informed in the same manner by witnesses with low reliability, but who are still sufficiently 
reliable that their testimony increases our degree of confidence. Then it is possible that in the former 
case – i.e. with witnesses of high reliability – our degree of confidence that all propositions in S are 
true is greater than our degree of confidence that all propositions in S’ are true, whereas in the latter 
case – i.e. with witnesses of low reliability – the reverse holds.  To make this more tangible, suppose 
that you are equally confident that all the items in information set S and that all the items in S’ are true.  
In the first case, you receive confirmation from, say, independent first-league scientists (whom you 
trust very much) that each element of these sets is true.  Then you would be more inclined to believe, 
say, S than S’.  Contrast this with a scenario in which you receive confirmation from, say, independent 
second-league scientists (whom you trust less) that each element of these sets is true.  Then you 
would be more inclined to believe S’ than S.  This me as a surprising result.             
 
Or let me turn to a different example.  We represent a proposal to be voted on in a federal assembly as 
a vector of utilities that indicate how the proposal affects each member in the federation. If utilities of 
the voters within states as well as between states are fully independent and certain other default 
assumptions on the probability density function hold, then utilitarianism and egalitarianism agree on a  
particular degree of proportionality for states within a federal assembly that is located between 
proportional and equal representation—viz. on the square root rule.  However, the more the utilities of 
the voters within states are aligned, the more utilitarianism tends toward proportional representation 
and the more egalitarianism tends toward equal representation.  Again, this strikes me as a surprising 
result.    
 
These kinds of results bring an element of wonder to philosophical inquiry.  At the same time, this 
sense of wonder is somewhat of a two-edged sword.  Probabilistic modelling can be hard-going in 
philosophy.  When you have results from simulations, the mathematician objects that she wants to see 
analytical results.  When you achieve analytical results, then the philosopher complains that she wants 
to understand why results come out this way.  And if you succeed in giving a good intuitive account of 
the result—taking away some of the surprise value—then the next question is: Did you really need to 
do all this work for that?  Indeed some modelling in philosophy is just bogus—results could equally well 
be presented by means of an intuitive story and the modelling exercise was at best a school exercise.  
But this is not always the case.  Sometimes intuition can do no better than indicate the way, show a 
general direction.  For the details of the case, the model remains indispensable.  
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Another trap is Strawson’s dictum that formal solutions to philosophical problems can be like giving a 
textbook in physiology to someone who says (with a sigh) that he wished he understood the workings 
of the human heart.  (See The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, edited by P.A. Schilpp,1963.)  Clearly, 
just like in the sciences, there is the caveat that one should try to construct a realistic model rather 
than gain simple and elegant answers at the cost of misrepresenting or shifting the problem.  I 
sometimes do have qualms of this sort about my work.  For example, our model of partially reliable 
instruments is contrived and some of the surprising results are no more than an artefact of the model.  
In such cases it’s not clear what is gained in our understanding about the world.  This is a problem that 
is not restricted to philosophy, unless it is the case that one could show that philosophical problems 
are such that what is essential always resists modelling.  I do not think that a general argument to this 
effect—i.e. an argument that philosophy stands to modelling as matters of the heart stand to 
physiology—is forthcoming.  If there are concerns of this nature, they would need to be voiced case by 
case.    
 
4. What do you consider the most neglected topics and/or contributions in probability theory 
and/or statistics? 
  
Let me tailor this question towards my own expertise – viz. the intersection between philosophy on the 
one hand and probability theory and statistics on the other hand.   
 
There is an extensive interest in probabilistic causation amongst philosophers and there is lots of room 
for interdisciplinary work.  Computer scientists contribute to questions that were once strictly in the 
realm of metaphysics and epistemology—such as the analysis of counterfactual statements in the work 
of Balke and Pearl.  Philosophers contribute to the development of algorithms for causal search and 
engage with research in statistics on causal models.  This is not surprising.  Philosophers have had a 
long-standing and continuing interest in causation and induction at least since the publication of 
Hume’s Treatise.  The increase in computational power has opened up many new avenues in statistics 
for the social sciences.  Something would be amiss if no bridges had been built between both areas of 
research.   
 
What is curious is that there are two areas of research that seem geographically equally close and 
their respective histories are similar, but there is much less activity in bridge construction.  In statistics 
for the social sciences, the increase of computational power has not only led to the development of 
causal modelling techniques, but also to the development of techniques for exploring and representing 
interrelations between multiple variables, such as cluster analysis, correspondence analysis, multi-
dimensional scaling and latent class analysis.  Why might philosophers care about such issues?   
 
The question of classification is at the heart of the ancient debates in the theory of universals with its 
core question—in virtue of what are two objects tokens of the same type?  Resemblance theorists 
worry about how to construct resemblance classes.  They might find it of interest that subjective 
resemblance judgments of, say, colour, can be comfortably (i.e. with stress below a threshold value) 
scaled in a two-dimensional plane, whereas other types of resemblance judgments require fewer or 
more dimensions.  
 
There has been a genuine explosion of multivariate methods to study interrelations between variables 
due to computational advances.  The interpretation of these methods and, in particular, the scope and 
legitimacy of their applications has received too little attention.  Now it’s not that the statistician is like 
Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice and that the philosopher needs to come to her aid.  But there is 
unexplored territory here and collaborative work between statisticians, social scientists and 
philosophers could prove rewarding in clarifying conceptual questions and questions of interpretation.                 
 
5. What do you consider the most important open problems in probability theory and/or 
statistics and what are the prospects for progress? 
 
I am going to seriously dodge this question.  Instead, let me float a few ideas that have been puzzling 
me in philosophy of probability.  The first one is a comment on an ongoing debate in philosophy of 
probability.  The second one is a curious clash of intuitions concerning counterfactuals and stochastic 
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events that deserves some attention.  The third one is a simple conjecture that seems like a school 
exercise, but is quite recalcitrant and has repercussions in game-theory.  The fourth one is an open 
question in strategic voting.  And considering that I have been teaching philosophy of public policy for 
the last five years, let me conclude with some normative questions about risk analysis.  Neither one of 
these is ‘the most important problem’ in philosophy of probability theory, but I hope that you will find 
them of some interest.     
   
First, ever since I read Hume’s On Miracles, I was bothered by the following issue.  Consider a miracle 
that is in the category of highly improbable events—six bullets fired from close range all missing their 
target, Pulp-Fiction style.  Or make it as improbable as you wish.  Suppose that we are informed that 
this happened to some monk in the 13th century and contrary to Hume, suppose that we know that this 
is a veridical report.  Then the natural thing is to shrug it off and say—strange things happen.  But the 
curious thing is that when that same equally improbable event happens to you, you may well go the 
route of Jules (in Pulp Fiction) and embrace theism.  Is this irrational?  Should I count what happens to 
me as equally good evidence as what happens to others?  Stephen Leeds and I (2002) tried to 
dissolve the puzzle, but I still think that it is more recalcitrant than our analysis suggests.  Though 
much work has been done on probability assignments to indexical statements, e.g. in connection with 
the self-selection bias, the doomsday argument, the puzzle of the absent-minded driver and Sleeping 
Beauty, our understanding of these issues seems very unsatisfactory.  I don’t foresee quick solutions 
that will put these paradoxes to rest.  Rather, there are insufficiently understood connections with other 
areas in philosophy, e.g. evidential versus causal decision theory and possibly the A- and B-theory of 
time.            
 
Second, it is a mark of a good philosophical problem that you can get a lay audience to split in half and 
stare at each other in utter disbelief.  In philosophy of probability, Newcomb’s problem comes to mind.  
However, in the Newcomb problem, it seems to me that non-philosophers are publicly ‘two-boxers’ but 
will deviate to ‘one-boxing’ in a secret ballot.  But let me suggest a case of split intuitions that has not 
received much discussion.  Suppose that I have the opportunity to invite Sue on Monday to a party that 
will take place on Saturday.  Independently of my decision, you will flip a fair coin and invite Sue on 
Wednesday if and only if Heads comes up.  Unbeknownst to both of us, Sue will come if and only if 
she is not invited by either you or me.  Now suppose that I invite Sue, you flip a coin, which comes up 
Tails, do not invite her and Sue does not come to the party.  Take the counterfactual: ‘If I had not 
invited Sue, she would have come to the party.’  This seems to me either false or indeterminate on 
Tuesday, because your coin flip may still come up Heads.  But it is true on Thursday—i.e. after your 
coin flip.  Is this not what it means to say that the outcome of your coin flip is causally independent of 
what I do?  I tried to model such truth-value switches or settlings over time. (Philosophical Studies, 
1998)  However, some people vehemently deny that this counterfactual is true on Thursday.  Their 
reasoning is that if I had not invited Sue, then I would have opened up a completely different world 
history and there is no telling how the coin would have come up in this world history.  If I take one path 
in Borges’s Garden of Forking Paths of possibilities then there is no reason to suppose that there is 
any parallel between how the path of actuality is implemented down the road and how it would have 
been implemented if I had taken the other path.  So on Thursday, it is still the case that Sue might or 
might not have come to the party, had I not invited her, because there is no telling how your coin would 
have come up on the world history initiated by my not inviting her.  I do not share this intuition, but I 
genuinely do not know what to make of it.  (Since writing this, I learned that this is in essence the 
“Morgenbesser problem”, presented by Michael Slote in the next to last footnote of  “Time in 
Counterfactuals” (2004) and discussed by Dorothy Edgington in Dowe and Noordhof’s Cause and 
Chance (2004).  In philosophy one often feels like the caveman who, sitting in front of his tools,  says 
“Hard times for inventors, everything has been invented.”  It seems as if we can do no better than lift a 
small tip of the veil and it’s hard to find a tip that has never been lifted before.  Nonetheless, I think that 
it’s worth flagging the need for a systematic investigation of this problem.)    
 
Third, consider the following problem.  Suppose that you can flip a coin n times.  If Heads comes up i 
times, you receive a certain sum of money xi.  The sequence of payoffs is single-peaked, i.e. it has the 
following form x0 < x1 < … xi-1 < xi  > xi+1 > … > xn for i = 0,…, n .  You know the values of each xi and 
are allowed to pick the probability p that the coin will come up Heads.  Show that there exists exactly 
one value of p which maximises your expected payoff. Proving this conjecture is challenging and 
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opens up some interesting venues for the analysis of doubly symmetric games which are relevant to 
the tragedy of the commons and to strategic voting in juries.  But too much needs to be said to fill in all 
the details.   
 
Fourth, this brings me to an open question in strategic voting in juries.  One tends to think that 
unanimity voting (rather than majority voting) in juries makes it less likely that the innocent will be 
convicted.  But this is not so obvious.  A jury member may reason as follows.  The only time that my 
vote matters is when all other voters vote guilty.  Now if they are voting strictly in accordance with their 
private assessments of the guilt or innocence of the suspect, then this provides me with additional 
information.  I may privately assess that the suspect is innocent, but this information could be 
outweighed by the fact that all others privately assess her to be guilty.  And should I not take this into 
account in my decision?  But of course, if we all reason like this, then we are bound to convict the 
innocent.  The rational strategy is a Nash Equilibrium of mixed strategies in which each player votes 
guilty with some probability, even if their private assessment is that the suspect is innocent.  And given 
some plausible values of the relevant parameters, the chance of convicting the innocent under 
unanimity vote may exceed this chance under majority vote.  This is the moral that is at the core of the 
literature on strategic voting in juries.  Now if our private assessments of guilt are equally reliable as of 
innocence, the prior probability of guilt equals the prior probability on innocence, and it is equally bad 
to convict the innocent as it is to acquit the guilty, then majority vote will induce truthful voting – i.e. 
voting one’s private assessment – and this voting rule maximises utility.  But what happens if we vary 
the reliability of our private assessment of guilt versus innocence?   For some crimes, it may be quite 
difficult to find the incriminating evidence for a guilty suspect.  For some crimes it may be all too easy 
to stumble upon misleading evidence against an innocent suspect.  In such cases, majority vote may 
not maximise truthfulness and may not maximise expected utility.  The voting rule that maximises 
truthfulness has a quota that diverges from simple majority.  Furthermore, the voting rule that 
maximises truthfulness sometimes maximises expected utility, but this is not always the case.  And 
what happens if we vary the prior probability of guilt?  Or if we stipulate that it is much worse to convict 
the innocent than to acquit the guilty?  There are some interesting results addressing these issues in 
the literature, but there are still many open questions.     
 
Finally, let me close with some issues in philosophy of public policy.  Defendants of risk analysis often 
take it to be a mark of a rational policy that for a given benefit the expected harm should be decisive 
between policies.  Clearly, the public is prone to misread evidence and one does not want to dictate 
policy on grounds of a misguided hysteria or carelessness.  Science should have the authority to 
overrule certain irrational biases.  But there are interesting cases in which more than the expected 
harm seems to matter.  Here are two examples.  First, Monsanto was under attack that Bovine Growth 
Hormone (BGH) increases the incidence of mastitis and since mastitis is treated by antibiotics, there is 
a certain expected harm to the public.  Monsanto defended itself by saying that BGH increases the 
milk production and it is the increased milk production that increases the incidence of mastitis.  So if 
there is a Markov chain from BGH over milk production to mastitis, then the increase in expected harm 
is permissible, but if there is a causal fork from BGH to milk production and to mastitis, then it is not.  It 
is interesting that at least for some people causal structure seems to matter to responsibility in the face 
of the same expected harm.  Second, suppose that we are comparing two projected public works.  Let 
us assume that the expected death rate is precisely one.  Now it matters a great deal how this 
expectation is generated.  For each person there is a sequence of tasks and for each task there is an 
associated exponential distribution that characterises the risk.  Now we can imagine that the risk is 
spread evenly across persons and across times.  This is less objectionable than when the risk is 
concentrated in one person or in one time slot.  We may prefer public works with a higher expected 
death rate to public works with a lower expected death rate because the spread of the risk across 
persons and across times is greater in the former than in the latter.  There are many cases in which 
policy-making is not informed by a scientific assessment of the expected harm.  But the challenge is to 
determine what considerations other than expected harm ought to enter the calculus and how this 
should be done in a principled fashion and what considerations ought to be dismissed as expressions 
of irrational biases and fears.   
 
I am afraid that this was not quite akin to Hilbert’s 23 open problems in mathematics, but I hope that 
these more modest questions may spark someone’s interest.       
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